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Psychology of Thinking

Changing Minds Is Harder Than You Think — and Easier Than You've Been Told

SkeptiCamp
Changing Minds Is Harder Than You Think — and Easier Than You've Been Told

Photo by Photo by Priscilla Du Preez 🇨🇦 on Unsplash on Unsplash

If you've spent any time in skeptic or science communication circles, you've probably heard some version of this: "Don't bother correcting people — it'll just make them believe the wrong thing more strongly." The idea has a name — the backfire effect — and it spread through popular science writing like wildfire in the early 2010s. It showed up in TED talks, journalism guides, and countless explainers about why facts don't change minds.

There's a genuine irony here. The backfire effect became one of the most widely cited findings in discussions about misinformation — and it turns out the evidence for it is, at best, much weaker than its reputation suggests. Newer research has largely failed to replicate the original findings, and the scientists who study this most closely now paint a significantly more complicated picture.

So what actually happens when you challenge someone's beliefs? And what does that mean for anyone trying to have a productive disagreement?

Where the Backfire Effect Came From

The original backfire effect research came from political scientists Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler in a 2010 paper. They found, in a series of experiments, that correcting political misinformation sometimes caused participants to hold their original beliefs more strongly rather than updating them. The finding was intuitive, alarming, and highly shareable — a perfect storm for viral science communication.

Here's what happened next: Nyhan and Reifler themselves went back and ran more experiments. So did other researchers. The result? The original backfire effect proved extremely difficult to replicate. A 2019 paper by Wood and Porter — titled, pointedly, "The Elusive Backfire Effect" — tested corrections across 52 different issues with thousands of participants and found essentially no evidence that corrections caused belief entrenchment. What they found instead was that people generally updated their factual beliefs somewhat when presented with accurate information, even if their attitude toward an issue didn't change much.

That distinction — between factual belief and attitude — turns out to be crucial.

What's Actually Going On

Human beings don't hold beliefs in isolation. Beliefs are embedded in identities, social groups, and emotional histories. When you challenge someone's belief about, say, vaccine safety or climate change, you're rarely just presenting them with new information. You're potentially threatening their sense of belonging to a community, their trust in their own judgment, and their relationship with people they care about.

This is what psychologists call "identity-protective cognition" — the tendency to evaluate evidence not just on its merits, but on what accepting it would mean for your social and personal identity. It's not stupidity. It's a deeply human response to social risk.

Motivated reasoning works similarly. People aren't passive recipients of information — they're active processors who unconsciously apply more scrutiny to evidence that threatens their existing views and less scrutiny to evidence that supports them. A committed anti-GMO activist and a committed GMO advocate can read the same study and come away with opposite conclusions about its quality, not because one is lying, but because they're genuinely experiencing the evidence differently.

The takeaway here isn't that people can't change their minds. The evidence suggests they can, and do, regularly. The issue is that how you present a correction matters enormously — and most of us are pretty bad at it.

The Social Cost Nobody Talks About

One underappreciated barrier to belief change is the social cost of changing your mind in front of someone who's trying to change it. Updating your views publicly, in response to a challenge, can feel like losing. It signals to your peer group that you can be pushed around. It requires admitting, at least implicitly, that you were wrong.

This is why people who change their minds often do so privately, after a conversation — not during it. Research on persuasion consistently shows that attitude change is more likely to happen after reflection than in the moment of disagreement. If your goal in a conversation is to watch someone immediately flip their position, you will almost always be disappointed. If your goal is to plant a seed that germinates later, you have a much better shot.

Strategies That Actually Work

So what does the evidence support? A few approaches have held up reasonably well:

Motivational interviewing techniques. Originally developed for clinical settings, motivational interviewing involves asking open-ended questions that invite people to articulate their own reasoning, rather than presenting them with your reasoning. When people explain their beliefs out loud, they often encounter the gaps themselves. Questions like "What would change your mind about this?" or "How did you come to believe that?" are more productive than "Here's why you're wrong."

Affirming identity before challenging beliefs. Research by Geoffrey Cohen and colleagues found that people were more willing to update their views when they'd first been asked to reflect on their own values — values unrelated to the topic being discussed. This "self-affirmation" technique seems to reduce the identity threat that makes people defensive.

Separating the claim from the person. There's a meaningful difference between "that claim is inaccurate" and "you're wrong." Framing corrections around the information rather than the person holding it reduces defensiveness significantly.

Not requiring immediate capitulation. Give people room to change their minds without losing face. Phrases like "I used to think that too" or "it's not obvious" lower the social cost of updating.

Choosing your battles. Not every belief is equally resistant to evidence, and not every conversation is worth having. Beliefs that are deeply tied to religious or political identity are harder to shift through factual correction alone. Beliefs that are more peripheral — held loosely, without strong social reinforcement — are much more movable.

What This Means for Skeptics

At SkeptiCamp, we spend a lot of time thinking about how to help people think more clearly. And one of the most important lessons from the actual science of persuasion is that being right isn't enough. The way you engage matters as much as the substance of what you're saying.

The backfire effect myth, ironically, may have caused real harm by convincing science communicators that correction is futile — leading some to give up on direct engagement entirely. The truth is more nuanced and more hopeful: people do update their beliefs, but they do it on their own terms, in their own time, and in ways that don't require them to feel humiliated in the process.

Changing minds is slower and messier than a good debate victory. But it happens. And understanding the actual psychology of belief change — rather than a pop-science shorthand — is what makes it possible.

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